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Abstract
Being a volunteer-run, distributed anonymity network,
Tor is vulnerable to Sybil attacks. Little is known about
real-world Sybils in the Tor network, and we lack prac-
tical tools and methods to expose Sybil attacks. In this
work, we develop sybilhunter, the first system for detect-
ing Sybil relays based on their appearance, such as con-
figuration; and behavior, such as uptime sequences. We
used sybilhunter’s diverse analysis techniques to analyze
nine years of archived Tor network data, providing us
with new insights into the operation of real-world attack-
ers. Our findings include diverse Sybils, ranging from
botnets, to academic research, and relays that hijack Bit-
coin transactions. Our work shows that existing Sybil
defenses do not apply to Tor, it delivers insights into real-
world attacks, and provides practical tools to uncover
and characterize Sybils, making the network safer for its
users.
1 Introduction
In a Sybil attack, an attacker controls many virtual iden-
tities to obtain disproportionately large influence in a net-
work. These attacks take many shapes, such as sockpup-
pets hijacking online discourse [34]; the manipulation of
BitTorrent’s distributed hash table [35]; and, most rele-
vant to our work, relays in the Tor network that seek to
deanonymize users [8]. In addition to coining the term
“Sybil,” Douceur showed that practical Sybil defenses
are challenging, arguing that Sybil attacks are always
possible without a central authority [11]. In this work,
we focus on Sybils in Tor—relays that are controlled by
a single operator. But what harm can Sybils do?
The effectiveness of many attacks on Tor depends on
how large a fraction of the network’s traffic—the consen-
sus weight—an attacker can observe. As the attacker’s
consensus weight grows, the following attacks become
easier.
Exit traffic tampering: A Tor user’s traffic traverses
exit relays, the last hop in a Tor circuit, when leav-
ing the Tor network. Controlling exit relays, an at-
tacker can sniff traffic to collect unencrypted cre-
dentials, break into TLS-protected connections, or
inject malicious content [37].
Website fingerprinting: Tor’s encryption prevents
guard relays (the first hop in a Tor circuit) from
learning their user’s online activity. Ignoring the
encrypted payload, an attacker can still take ad-
vantage of flow information such as packet lengths
and timings to infer what web site her users are
connecting to [18].
Bridge address harvesting: Users behind censorship
firewalls use private Tor relays (“bridges”) as hid-
den stepping stones into the Tor network. It is im-
portant that censors cannot obtain all bridge ad-
dresses, which is why bridge distribution is rate-
limited. However, an attacker can harvest bridge
addresses by running a middle relay and looking
for incoming connections that do not originate from
any of the publicly known guard relays [23].
End-to-end correlation: By running both entry guards
and exit relays, an attacker can use timing analysis
to link a Tor user’s identity to her activity, e.g., learn
that Alice is visiting Facebook. For this attack to
work, an attacker must run at least two Tor relays, or
be able to eavesdrop on at least two networks [15].
Configuring a relay to forward more traffic allows an
attacker to increase her consensus weight. However, the
capacity of a single relay is limited by its link band-
width and, because of the computational cost of cryptog-
raphy, by CPU. Ultimately, increasing consensus weight
requires an adversary to add relays to the network; we
call these additional relays Sybils.
In addition to the above attacks, an adversary needs
Sybil relays to manipulate onion services, which are TCP
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servers whose IP address is hidden by Tor. In the current
onion service protocol, six Sybil relays are sufficient to
take offline an onion service because of a weakness in
the design of the distributed hash table (DHT) that pow-
ers onion services [4]. Finally, instead of being a direct
means to an end, Sybil relays can be a side effect of an-
other issue. In Section 5.1, we provide evidence for what
appears to be botnets whose zombies are running Tor re-
lays, perhaps because of a misguided attempt to help the
Tor network grow.
Motivated by the lack of practical Sybil detection
tools, we design and implement heuristics, leveraging
that Sybils (i) frequently go online and offline simulta-
neously, (ii) share similarities in their configuration, and
(iii) may change their identity fingerprint—a relay’s fin-
gerprint is the hash over its public key—frequently, to
manipulate Tor’s DHT. We implemented these heuristics
in a tool, sybilhunter, whose development required a ma-
jor engineering effort because we had to process 100 GiB
of data and millions of files. We used sybilhunter to an-
alyze archived network data, dating back to 2007, to dis-
cover past attacks and anomalies. Finally, we character-
ize the Sybil groups we discovered. To sum up, we make
the following key contributions:
• We design and implement sybilhunter, a tool to an-
alyze past and future Tor network data. While we
designed it specifically for the use in Tor, our tech-
niques are general in nature and can easily be ap-
plied to other distributed systems such as I2P [31].
• We expose and characterize Sybil groups, and pub-
lish our findings as datasets to stimulate future re-
search.1 We find that Sybils run MitM attacks, DoS
attacks, and are used for research projects.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. We
begin by discussing related work in Section 2 and give
some background on Tor in Section 3. Section 4 presents
the design of our analysis tools, which is then followed
by experimental results in Section 5. We discuss our re-
sults in Section 6 and conclude the paper in Section 7.
2 Related work
In his seminal 2002 paper, Douceur showed that only a
central authority that verifies new nodes as they join the
distributed system is guaranteed to prevent Sybils [11].
This approach conflicts with Tor’s design philosophy that
seeks to distribute trust and eliminate central points of
control. In addition, a major factor contributing to Tor’s
network growth is the low barrier of entry, allowing op-
erators to set up relays both quickly and anonymously.
1The dataset is online at https://nymity.ch/sybilhunting/.
An identity-verifying authority would raise that barrier,
alienate privacy-conscious relay operators, and impede
Tor’s growth. Barring a central authority, researchers
have proposed techniques that leverage a resource that is
difficult for an attacker to scale. Two categories of Sybil-
resistant schemes turned out to be particularly popular,
schemes that build on social constraints and schemes
that build on computational constraints. For a broad
overview of alternative Sybil defenses, refer to Levine
et al. [20].
Social constraints rely on the assumption that it is dif-
ficult for an attacker to form trust relationships with hon-
est users, e.g., befriend many unknown people on on-
line social networks. Past work leveraged this assump-
tion in systems such as SybilGuard [39], SybilLimit [38],
and SybilInfer [6]. Unfortunately, social graph-based de-
fenses do not work in our setting because there is no ex-
isting trust relationship between relay operators.2 Note
that we could create such a relationship by, e.g., linking
relays to their operator’s social networking account, or
by creating a “relay operator web of trust,” but again, we
believe that such an effort would alienate relay operators
and receive limited adoption.
Orthogonal to social constraints, computational re-
source constraints guarantee that an attacker that seeks to
operate 100 Sybils needs 100 times the computational re-
sources she would have needed for a single virtual iden-
tity. Both Borisov [5] and Li et al. [22] used compu-
tational puzzles for that purpose. Computational con-
straints work well in distributed systems where the cost
of joining the network is low. For example, a lightweight
client is enough to use BitTorrent, allowing even low-end
consumer devices to participate. However, this is not the
case in Tor because relay operations require constant use
of bandwidth and CPU. Unlike in many other distributed
systems, it is impossible to run 100 Tor relays while not
spending the resources for 100 relays. Computational
constraints are inherent to running a relay.
There has also been progress outside of academic re-
search; namely, The Tor Project has incorporated a num-
ber of both implicit and explicit Sybil defenses that are in
place as of February 2016. First, directory authorities—
the “gatekeepers” of the Tor network—accept at most
two relays per IP address to prevent low-resource Sybil
attacks [3, 2]. Similarly, Tor’s path selection algorithm
states that Tor clients never select two relays in the same
/16 network [9]. Second, directory authorities automat-
ically assign flags to relays, indicating their status and
quality of service. The Tor Project has recently increased
the minimal time until relays obtain the Stable flag
(seven days) and the HSDir flag (96 hours). This change
2Relay operators can express in their configuration that their relays
are run by the same operator, but this denotes an intra-person and not
an inter-person trust relationship.
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increases the cost of Sybil attacks and gives Tor devel-
opers more time to discover and block suspicious relays
before they get in a position to run an attack. Finally,
the operation of a Tor relay causes recurring costs—most
notably bandwidth and electricity—which can further re-
strain an adversary.
In summary, we believe that existing Sybil defenses do
not work well when applied to the Tor network; its dis-
tinctive features call for customized solutions that con-
sider the nature of Tor relays.
3 Background
We now provide necessary background on the Tor net-
work [10]. Tor consists of several thousand volunteer-run
relays that are summarized in the network consensus that
is voted on and published every hour by eight distributed
directory authorities. The authorities assign a variety of
flags to relays:
Valid: The relay is valid, i.e., not known to be broken.
HSDir: The relay is an onion service directory, i.e., it
participates in the DHT that powers Tor onion ser-
vices.
Exit: The relay is an exit relay.
BadExit: The relay is an exit relay but is either mis-
configured or malicious, and should therefore not
be used by Tor clients.
Stable: Relays are stable if their mean time between
failure is at least the median of all relays, or at least
seven days.
Guard: Guard relays are the rarely-changing first hop
for Tor clients.
Running: A relay is running if the directory authorities
could connect to it in the last 45 minutes.
Tor relays are uniquely identified by their fingerprint,
a Base32-encoded and truncated SHA-1 hash over their
public key. Operators can further assign a nickname to
their Tor relays, which is a string that identifies a relay
(albeit not uniquely) and is easier to remember than its
pseudo-random fingerprint. Exit relays have an exit pol-
icy—a list of IP addresses and ports that the relay allows
connections to. Finally, operators that run more than one
relay are encouraged to configure their relays to be part
of a relay family. Families are used to express that a set
of relays is controlled by a single party. Tor clients never
use more than one family member in their path to pre-
vent correlation attacks. As of February 2016, there are
approximately 400 relay families in all 7,000 relays.
4 Data and design
We define Sybils in the Tor network as two or more re-
lays that are controlled by a single person or group of
Figure 1: Sybilhunter’s architecture. Two datasets serve
as input to sybilhunter; consensuses and server descrip-
tors, and malicious relays gathered with exitmap [37].
people. Sybils per se do not have to be malicious; a relay
operator could simply have forgotten to configure her re-
lays as a relay family. Such Sybils are no threat to the Tor
network, which is why we refer to them as benign Sybils.
What we are interested in is malicious Sybils whose pur-
pose is to deanonymize or otherwise harm Tor users.
We draw on two datasets—one publicly available and
one created by us—to uncover malicious Sybils. Our de-
tection methods are implemented in a tool, sybilhunter,
which takes as input our two datasets and then attempts
to expose Sybil groups, as illustrated in Figure 1. Sybil-
hunter is implemented in Go and consists of 3,300 lines
of code.
4.1 Datasets
Figure 1 shows how we use our two datasets. Archived
consensuses and router descriptors (in short: descriptors)
allow us to (i) restore past states of the Tor network,
which sybilhunter mines for Sybil groups, and to (ii) find
“partners in crime” of malicious exit relays that we dis-
covered by running exitmap, a scanner for Tor exit relays
that is presented below.
4.1.1 Consensuses and router descriptors
The consensus and descriptor dataset is publicly avail-
able on CollecTor [32], an archiving service that is run
by The Tor Project. Some of the archived data dates back
to 2004, allowing us to restore arbitrary Tor network con-
figurations from the last ten years. Not all of CollecTor’s
archived data is relevant to our hunt for Sybils, however,
which is why we only analyze the following two:
Descriptors Tor relays and bridges periodically upload
router descriptors, which capture their configuration, to
directory authorities. Figure 2 shows an example in the
box to the right. Relays upload their descriptors no later
than every 18 hours, or sooner, depending on certain con-
ditions. Note that some information in router descriptors
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Consensus
Router status
Descriptor pointer
Nickname
Fingerprint
Publication
Address and ports
Flags
Version
Bandwidth
Exit policy
. . .
Router descriptor
Address and ports
Platform
Protocols
Published
Fingerprint
Uptime
Bandwidth
Signature
Figure 2: Our primary dataset contains consensuses and
router descriptors.
Dataset # of files Size Time span
Consensuses 72,061 51 GiB 10/2007–01/2016
Descriptors 34,789,777 52 GiB 12/2005–01/2016
Table 1: An overview of our primary dataset; consen-
suses and server descriptors since 2007 and 2005, respec-
tively.
is not verified by directory authorities. Therefore, relays
can spoof information such as their operating system, Tor
version, and uptime.
Consensuses Each hour, the nine directory authorities
vote on their view of all Tor relays that are currently on-
line. The vote produces the consensus, an authoritative
list that comprises all running Tor relays, represented as
a set of router statuses. Each router status in the consen-
sus contains basic information about Tor relays such as
their bandwidth, flags, and exit policy. It also contains
a pointer to the relay’s descriptor, as shown in Figure 2.
As of February 2016, consensuses contain approximately
7,000 router statuses, i.e., each hour, 7,000 router sta-
tuses are published, and archived, by CollecTor.
Table 1 gives an overview of the size of our consen-
sus and descriptor archives. We found it challenging to
repeatedly process these millions of files, amounting to
more than 100 GiB of uncompressed data. In our first
processing attempt, we used the Python parsing library
Stem [17], which is maintained by The Tor Project. The
data volume turned out to be difficult to handle for Stem
because of Python’s interpreted and dynamic nature. To
process our dataset more efficiently, we implemented a
custom parser in Go [36].
4.1.2 Malicious exit relays
In addition to our publicly available and primary dataset,
we collected malicious exit relays over 18 months. We
call exit relays malicious if they modify forwarded traffic
in bad faith, e.g., to run man-in-the-middle attacks. We
add these relays to our dataset because they frequently
surface in groups, as malicious Sybils, because an at-
tacker runs the same attack on several, physically dis-
tinct exit relays. Winter et al.’s work [37, §5.2] further
showed that attackers make an effort to stay under the
radar, which is why we cannot only rely on active prob-
ing to find such relays. We also seek to find potential
“partners in crime” of each newly discovered malicious
relay, which we discuss in Section 4.3.4.
We exposed malicious exit relays using Winter et al.’s
exitmap tool [37]. Exitmap is a Python-based scanning
framework for Tor exit relays. Exitmap modules per-
form a network task that can then be run over all exit
relays. One use case is HTTPS man-in-the-middle detec-
tion: A module can fetch the certificate of a web server
over all exit relays and then compare its fingerprint with
the expected, valid fingerprint. Exposed attacks, how-
ever, can be difficult to attribute because an attack can
take place upstream of the exit relay, e.g., at a malicious
autonomous system.
In addition to the original modules that the exitmap
authors shared with us, we implemented exitmap mod-
ules to detect HTML tampering and TLS downgrading,
by connecting to servers under our control and raising
an alert if the returned HTML or TLS server hello were
modified. Our modules ran from August 2014 to January
2016 and discovered 251 malicious exit relays, shown
in Appendix A, that we all reported to The Tor Project,
which subsequently blocked these relays.
4.2 Threat model
Most of this paper is on applying sybilhunter to archived
network data, but we can also apply it to newly incoming
data. This puts us in an adversarial setting as attackers
can tune their Sybils to evade our system. This is re-
flected in our adversarial assumptions. We assume that
an adversary does run more than one Tor relay and ex-
hibits redundancy in their relay configuration, or uptime
sequence. An adversary further can know how sybil-
hunter’s modules work, run active or passive attacks, and
make a limited effort to stay under the radar, by diversi-
fying parts of their configuration. To detect Sybils, how-
ever, our heuristics require some redundancy.
4.3 Analysis techniques
Having discussed our datasets and threat model, we now
turn to presenting techniques that can expose Sybils. Our
techniques are based on the insight that Sybil relays typ-
ically behave or appear similarly. Shared configura-
tion parameters such as port numbers and nicknames
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Figure 3: Sybilhunter’s internal architecture.
cause similar appearance whereas Sybils behave simi-
larly when they reboot simultaneously, or exhibit iden-
tical quirks when relaying traffic.
Sybilhunter can analyze (i) historical network data,
dating back to 2007; (ii) online data, to detect new Sybils
as they join the network; and (iii) find relays that might
be associated with previously discovered, malicious re-
lays. Figure 3 shows sybilhunter’s internal architecture.
Tor network data first passes a filtering component that
can be used to inspect a subset of the data. It is then for-
warded to one or more modules that implement an anal-
ysis technique. These modules work independently, but
share a data structure to find suspicious relays that show
up in more than one module. Depending on the analysis
technique, sybilhunter’s output is CSV files or images.
While developing sybilhunter, we had to make many
design decisions that we tackled by drawing on the expe-
rience we gained by manually analyzing numerous Sybil
groups. We iteratively improved our code and augmented
it with new features when we experienced operational
shortcomings.
4.3.1 Network churn
The churn rate of a distributed system captures the rate
of joining and leaving network participants. In the Tor
network, these participants are relays. An unexpect-
edly high churn rate between two subsequent consen-
suses means that many relays joined or left, which can
reveal Sybils and other network issues because Sybil op-
erators frequently start and stop their Sybils at the same
time, to ease administration—they behave similarly.
The Tor Project is maintaining a Python script [16]
that determines the number of previously unobserved re-
lay fingerprints in new consensuses. If that number is
greater than or equal to the static threshold 50, the script
sends an e-mail alert. We reimplemented the script in
sybilhunter and ran it over all archived consensus docu-
ments, dating back to 2007. The script raised 47 alerts
in nine years, all of which seemed to be true positives,
i.e., they should be of interest to The Tor Project. The
script did not raise false positives, presumably because
the median number of new fingerprints in a consensus is
only six—significantly below the conservative threshold
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Figure 4: A flat hill of new relays in 2009. The time
series was smoothed using a moving average with a win-
dow size of 12 hours.
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Figure 5: A sudden spike of new relays in 2010. The
time series was smoothed using a moving average with a
window size of 12 hours.
of 50. Yet, the threshold likely causes false negatives, but
we cannot determine the false negative rate because we
lack ground truth. In addition, The Tor Project’s script
does not consider relays that left the network, does not
distinguish between relays with different flags, and does
not adapt its threshold as the network grows. We now
present an alternative approach that is more flexible and
robust.
We found that churn anomalies worthy of our attention
range from flat hills (Fig. 4) to sudden spikes (Fig. 5).
Flat hills can be a sign of an event that concerned a large
number of relays, over many hours or days. Such an
event happened shortly after the Heartbleed bug, when
The Tor Project asked relay operators to generate new
keys. Relay operators acted gradually, most within two
days. Sudden spikes can happen if an attacker adds many
relays, all at once. These are mere examples, however;
the shape of a time series cannot tell us anything about
the nature of the underlying incident.
To quantify the churn rate α between two subsequent
consensus documents, we adapt Godfrey et al.’s formula,
which yields a churn value that captures both systems
that joined and systems that left the network [14]. How-
ever, an unusually low number of systems that left could
cancel out an unusually high number of new systems and
vice versa—an undesired property for a technique that
should spot abnormal changes. To address this issue, we
split the formula in two parts, creating a time series for
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new relays (αn) and for relays that left (αl). Ct is the net-
work consensus at time t, and \ denotes the complement
between two consensuses, i.e., the relays that are in the
left operand, but not the right operand. We define αn and
αl as
αn =
|Ct \Ct−1|
|Ct | and αl =
|Ct−1 \Ct |
|Ct−1| . (1)
Both αn and αl are bounded to the interval [0,1]. A
churn value of 0 indicates no change between two sub-
sequent consensuses whereas a churn value of 1 indi-
cates a complete turnover. Determining αn,l for the se-
quence Ct ,Ct−1, . . . , Ct−n, yields a time series of churn
values that can readily be inspected for abnormal spikes.
We found that many churn anomalies are caused by re-
lays that share a flag, or a flag combination, e.g., HSDir
(onion service directories) and Exit (exit relays). There-
fore, sybilhunter can also generate per-flag churn time
series that can uncover patterns that would be lost in a
flag-agnostic time series.
Finally, to detect changes in the underlying time se-
ries trend—flat hills—we can smooth αn,l using a simple
moving average λ defined as
λ =
1
w
·
w
∑
i=0
αi. (2)
As we increase the window size w, we can detect more
subtle changes in the underlying churn trend. If λ or αn,l
exceed a manually defined threshold, an alert is raised.
Section 5.2 elaborates on how a threshold can be chosen
in practice.
4.3.2 Uptime matrix
For convenience, Sybil operators are likely to administer
their relays simultaneously, i.e., update, configure, and
reboot them all at the same time. This is reflected in their
relays’ uptime. An operating system upgrade that re-
quires a reboot of Sybil relays will induce a set of relays
to go offline and return online in a synchronized manner.
To isolate such events, we are visualizing the uptime pat-
terns of Tor relays by grouping together relays whose up-
time is highly correlated. The churn technique presented
above is similar but it only provides an aggregate, high-
level view on how Tor relays join and leave the network.
Since the technique is aggregate, it is poorly suited for
visualizing the uptime of specific relays; an abnormally
high churn value attracts our attention but does not tell
us what caused the anomaly. To fill this gap, we comple-
ment the churn analysis with an uptime matrix that we
will now present.
This uptime matrix consists of the uptime patterns of
all Tor relays, which we represent as binary sequences.
Figure 6: The uptime matrix for 3,000 Tor relays for
all of November 2012. Rows represent consensuses and
columns represent relays. Black pixels mean that a relay
was online, and white means offline. Red blocks denote
relays with identical uptime.
Each hour, when a new consensus is published, we add
a new data point—“online” or “offline”—to each Tor re-
lay’s sequence. We visualize all sequences in a bitmap
whose rows represent consensuses and whose columns
represent relays. Each pixel denotes the uptime status
of a particular relay at a particular hour. Black pixels
mean that the relay was online and white pixels mean
that the relay was offline. This type of visualization was
first proposed by Ensafi and subsequently implemented
by Fifield [13].
Of particular importance is how the uptime sequences
are sorted. If highly correlated sequences are not adja-
cent in the visualization, we might miss them. We sort
sequences using single-linkage clustering, a type of hier-
archical clustering algorithm that forms groups bottom-
up, based on the minimum distance between group mem-
bers. Our clustering algorithm requires a distance func-
tion. Similar to Andersen et al. [1], we use Pearson’s
correlation coefficient as our distance function because
it tells us if two uptime sequences change together. The
sample correlation coefficient r yields a value in the in-
terval [−1,1]. A coefficient of −1 denotes perfect anti-
correlation (relay R1 is only online when relay R2 is of-
fline) and 1 denotes perfect correlation (relay R1 is only
online when relay R2 is online). We define our distance
function as d(r) = 1− r, so two perfectly correlated se-
quences have a distance of zero while two perfectly anti-
correlated sequences have a distance of two. Once all
sequences are sorted, we color adjacent sequences in red
if their uptime sequence is identical. Figure 6 shows an
example of our visualization algorithm, the uptime ma-
trix for a subset of all Tor relays in November 2012.
4.3.3 Fingerprint analysis
The information a Tor client needs to connect to an onion
service is stored in a DHT that consists of a subset of all
Tor relays, the onion service directories (HSDirs). As of
February 2016, 46% of all Tor relays serve as HSDirs.
A daily-changing set of six HSDirs host the contact in-
formation of any given onion service. Tor clients contact
one of these six HSDirs to request information about the
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onion service they intend to connect to. A HSDir be-
comes responsible for an onion service if the difference
between its relay fingerprint and the service’s descriptor
ID is smaller than that of any other relay. The descrip-
tor ID is derived from the onion service’s public key, a
time stamp, and additional information. All HSDirs are
public, making it possible to determine at which position
in the DHT an onion service will end up at any point in
the future. Attackers can exploit the ability to predict
the DHT position by repeatedly generating identity keys
until their fingerprint is sufficiently close to the targeted
onion service’s index, thus becoming its HSDir [4].
We detect relays that change their fingerprint fre-
quently by maintaining a lookup table that maps a relay’s
IP address to a list of all fingerprints we have seen it use.
We sort the lookup table by the relays that changed their
fingerprints the most, and output the results.
4.3.4 Nearest-neighbor search
We frequently found ourselves in a situation where ex-
itmap discovered a malicious exit relay and we were left
wondering if there were similar, potentially associated
relays. Looking for such relays involved extensive man-
ual work, which we soon started to automate. We needed
an algorithm for nearest-neighbor search that takes as
input a “seed” relay and finds its n most similar neigh-
bors. We define similarity as shared configuration pa-
rameters such as port numbers, IP addresses, exit poli-
cies, or bandwidth values. Our search algorithm sorts
relays by comparing these configuration parameters.
To quantify the similarity between two relays, we use
the Levenshtein distance, a distance metric that takes as
input two strings and determines the minimum number of
modifications—insert, delete, and modify—that are nec-
essary to turn string s2 into s1. Our algorithm turns the
router statuses and descriptors of two relays into strings
and determines their Levenshtein distance. As an ex-
ample, consider a simplified configuration representation
consisting of the concatenation of nickname, IP address,
and port. To turn string s2 into s1, six operations are
necessary; three modifications (green) and two deletions
(red):
s1: Foo10.0.0.19001
s2: Bar10.0.0.2549001
Our algorithm determines the Levenshtein distance
between a “seed” relay and all n− 1 relays in a consen-
sus. It then sorts the calculated distances in ascending
order and prints the most similar relays to the console.
For a consensus consisting of 6,525 relays, our algorithm
takes approximately 1.5 seconds to finish.3
3We measured on an Intel Core i7-3520M CPU at 2.9 GHz, a
consumer-grade CPU.
5 Evaluation and results
Equipped with sybilhunter, we applied our techniques
to nine years of archived Tor network data, resulting
in several megabytes of CSV files and uptime images.
We sorted our results in descending order by severity,
and started manually analyzing the most significant in-
cidents. Several outliers were caused by problems and
events in the Tor network that were unrelated to Sybil re-
lays. Instead of providing an exhaustive list of all poten-
tial Sybils, we focus on our most salient findings—relay
groups that were either clearly malicious or distinguished
themselves otherwise.4
Once we discovered a seemingly harmful Sybil group,
we reported it to The Tor Project. To defend against
Sybil attacks, directory authorities can either remove a
relay from the consensus, or take away its Valid flag,
which means that the relay is still in the consensus, but
Tor clients will not consider it for their first or last hop in
a circuit. The majority of directory authorities, i.e., five
out of eight, must agree on either strategy. This mecha-
nism is meant to distribute the power of removing relays
into the hands of a diverse set of people.
We present our results by first giving an overview of
the most interesting Sybils we discovered in Section 5.1;
followed by technique-specific results in Sections 5.2,
5.3, and 5.4; an evaluation of our nearest-neighbor search
in Section 5.5; and the computational cost of our tech-
niques in Section 5.6.
5.1 Sybil characterization
Table 2 shows the most interesting Sybil groups we iden-
tified. The columns show (i) what we believe to be the
purpose of the Sybils, (ii) when the Sybil group was at
its peak size, (iii) the ID we gave the Sybils, (iv), the
number of Sybil fingerprints, (v) the analysis techniques
that could discover the Sybils, and (vi) a short descrip-
tion. The analysis techniques are abbreviated as “E” (ex-
itmap), “C” (Churn), “U” (Uptime), “F” (Fingerprint),
and “N” (Neighbor search). We now discuss the most
insightful incidents in greater detail.
The “rewrite” Sybils These recurring Sybils hi-
jacked Bitcoin transactions by rewriting Bitcoin ad-
dresses. All relays had the Exit flag and replaced
onion domains found in a web server’s HTTP response
with an impersonation domain, presumably hosted by
the attacker. Interestingly, the impersonation do-
mains shared a prefix with the original. For exam-
ple, sigaintevyh2rzvw.onion was replaced with the im-
4Our datasets and visualizations are available online, and can be
inspected for an exhaustive list of potential Sybils. The URL is https:
//nymity.ch/sybilhunting/.
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Purpose Peak activity Group ID Number Method Description
MitM
Jan 2016 rewrite† 42 E Replaced onion domains with impersonation site.
Nov 2015 rewrite† 8 E Replaced onion domains with impersonation site.
Jun 2015 rewrite† 55 E Replaced onion domains with impersonation site.
Apr 2015 rewrite† 71 U,E Replaced onion domains with impersonation site.
Mar 2015 redirect‡ 24 E Redirected users to impersonated site.
Feb 2015 redirect‡ 17 E Redirected users to impersonated site.
Jan 2015 redirect‡ 26 E Redirected users to impersonated site.
Botnet Mar 2014 default — N Likely a Windows-powered botnet. The group features
wide geographical distribution, which is uncommon for
typical Tor relays.
Oct 2010 trotsky 649 N The relays were likely part of a botnet. They appeared
gradually, and were all running Windows.
Unknown
Jan 2016 cloudvps 61 C,U Hosted by Dutch hoster XL Internet Services.
Nov 2015 11BX1371 150 C,U All relays were in two /24 networks and a single relay
had the Exit flag.
Jul 2015 DenkoNet 58 U Hosted on Amazon AWS and only present in a single
consensus. No relay had the Exit flag.
Jul 2015 cloudvps 55 C,U All relays only had the Running and Valid flag. As
their name suggests, the relays were hosted by the Dutch
hoster “CloudVPS.”
Dec 2014 Anonpoke 284 C,U The relays did not have the Exit flag and were removed
from the network before they could get the HSDir flag.
Dec 2014 FuslVZTOR 246 C,U The relays showed up only hours after the LizardNSA
incident.
DoS Dec 2014 LizardNSA 4,615 C,U A group publicly claimed to be responsible for the at-
tack [25]. All relays were hosted in the Google cloud
and The Tor Project removed them within hours.
Research
May 2015 fingerprints 168 F All twelve IP addresses, located in the same /24, changed
their fingerprint regularly, presumably in an attempt to
manipulate the distributed hash table.
Mar 2014 FDCservers 264 C,U Relays that were involved in an experimental onion ser-
vice deanonymization attack [8].
Feb 2013 AmazonEC2 1,424 F,C,U We observed 1,424 relay fingerprints on 88 IP addresses.
These Sybils were likely part of a research project [4].
Jun 2010 planetlab 595 C,U According to a report from The Tor Project [21], a re-
searcher started these relays to learn more about scala-
bility effects.
Table 2: The Sybil groups we discovered using sybilhunter and our exitmap modules. We believe that groups marked
with the symbols † and ‡ were run by the same operator, respectively.
personation domain sigaintz7qjj3val.onion whose first
seven digits are identical to the original. The attacker
could create shared prefixes by repeatedly generating key
pairs until the hash over the public key resembled the de-
sired prefix. Onion domains are generated by determin-
ing the SHA-1 hash over the public key, truncating it to
its 80 most significant bits, and encoding it in Base32.
Each Base32 digit of the 16-digit-domain represents five
bits. Therefore, to get an n-digit prefix in the onion do-
main, 25n−1 operations are required on average. For the
seven-digit prefix above, this results in 25·7−1 = 234 op-
erations. The author of scallion [30], a tool for gener-
ating vanity onion domains, determined that an nVidia
Quadro K2000M, a mid-range laptop GPU, is able to
generate 90 million hashes per second. On this GPU,
a partial collision for a seven-digit prefix can be found
in 234 · 190,000,000 ' 190 seconds, i.e., just over three min-
utes.
We inspected some of the phishing domains and found
that the attackers replaced the original Bitcoin addresses,
presumably with addresses under their control, to hijack
transactions. Therefore, we believe that this attack was
financially motivated.
The “redirect” Sybils These relays all had the Exit
flag and tampered with HTTP redirects of exit traffic.
Some Bitcoin sites would redirect users from their HTTP
site to the encrypted HTTPS version, to protect their
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users’ login credentials. This Sybil group tampered with
the redirect and directed users to an impersonation site,
resembling the original Bitcoin site, perhaps to steal cre-
dentials. We only observed this attack for Bitcoin sites,
but cannot rule out that other sites were not attacked.
Interestingly, the Sybils’ descriptors and consensus
entries had less in common than other Sybil groups.
They used a small set of different ports, Tor versions,
bandwidth values, and their nicknames did not exhibit
an easily-recognizable pattern. In fact, the only reason
why we know that these Sybils belong together is be-
cause their attack was identical.
We discovered three Sybil groups that implemented
the redirect attack, each of them beginning to surface
when the previous one got blocked. The initial group
first showed up in May 2014, with only two relays, but
slowly grew over time, until it was finally discovered in
January 2015. We believe that these Sybils were run by
the same attacker because their attack was identical.
It is possible that this Sybil group was run by the same
attackers that controlled the “rewrite” group but we have
no evidence to support that hypothesis. Interestingly,
only our exitmap module was able to spot these Sybils.
The relays joined the network gradually over time and
had little in common in their configuration, which is why
our sybilhunter methods failed. In fact, we cannot rule
out that the adversary was upstream, or gained control
over these relays.
The “FDCservers” Sybils These Sybils were used to
deanonymize onion service users, as discussed by The
Tor Project in a July 2014 blog post [8]. Supposedly,
CMU/CERT researchers were executing a traffic confir-
mation attack by sending sequences of RELAY_EARLY and
RELAY cells as a signal down the circuit to the client,
which the reference implementation never does [8, 7].
The attacking relays were onion service directories and
guards, allowing them to control both ends of the circuit
for some Tor clients that were fetching onion service de-
scriptors. Most relays were running FreeBSD, used Tor
in version 0.2.4.18-rc, had identical flags, mostly iden-
tical bandwidth values, and were located in 50.7.0.0/16
and 204.45.0.0/16. All of these shared configuration op-
tions made the relays easy to identify.
The relays were added to the network in batches, pre-
sumably starting in October 2013. On January 30, 2014,
the attackers added 58 relays to the 63 existing ones, giv-
ing them control over 121 relays. On July 8, 2014, The
Tor Project blocked all 123 IP addresses that were run-
ning at the time.
The “default” Sybils This group, named after the
Sybils’ shared nickname “default,” has been around since
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Figure 7: The number of “default” and “trotsky” Sybil
members over time.
September 2011 and consists of Windows-powered re-
lays only. We extracted relays by filtering consensuses
for the nickname “default,” onion routing port 443, and
directory port 9030. The group features high IP address
churn. For October 2015, we found “default” relays in
73 countries, with the top three countries being Ger-
many (50%), Russia (8%), and Austria (7%). The major-
ity of these relays, however, has little uptime. Figure 17
shows the uptime matrix for “default” relays in October
2015. Many relays exhibit a diurnal pattern, suggesting
that they are powered off regularly—as it often is the case
for desktop computers and laptops.
To get a better understanding of the number of “de-
fault” relays over time, we analyzed all consensuses, ex-
tracting the number of relays whose nickname was “de-
fault,” whose onion routing port was 443, and whose di-
rectory port was 9001. We did this for the first consensus
every day and plot the result in Figure 7. Note that we
might overestimate the numbers as our filter could cap-
ture unrelated relays.
The above suggests that some of the “default” relays
are running without the owner’s knowledge. While the
relays do not fit the pattern of Sefnit (a.k.a. Mevade) [27]
and Skynet [28]—two pieces of malware that use an
onion service as command and control server—we be-
lieve that the “default” relays constitute a botnet.
The “trotsky” Sybils Similar to the “default” group,
the “trotsky” relays appear to be part of a botnet. Most
of the relays’ IP addresses were located in Eastern Eu-
rope, in particular in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The relays were all running on Windows,
in version 0.2.1.26, and listening on port 443. Most of
the relays were configured as exits, and The Tor Project
assigned some of them the BadExit flag.
The first “trotsky” members appeared in September
2010. Over time, there were two relay peaks, reaching
139 (September 23) and 219 (October 3) relays, as illus-
trated in Figure 7. After that, only 1–3 relays remained
in the consensus.
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The “Amazon EC2” Sybils The relays all used
randomly-generated nicknames, consisting of sixteen or
seventeen letters and numbers; Tor in version 0.2.2.37;
GNU/Linux; and IP addresses in Amazon’s EC2 net-
block. Each of the 88 IP addresses changed its finger-
print 24 times, but not randomly: the fingerprints were
chosen systematically, in a small range. For example, re-
lay 54.242.248.129 had fingerprints with the prefixes 8D,
8E, 8F, and 90. The relays were online for 48 hours. After
24 hours, most of the relays obtained the HSDir flag.
We believe that this Sybil group was run by Biryukov,
Pustogarov, and Weinmann as part of their Security
and Privacy 2013 paper “Trawling for Tor Hidden Ser-
vices” [4]—one of the few Sybil groups that were likely
run by academic researchers.
The “FuslVZTOR” Sybils All machines were middle
relays and hosted in 212.38.181.0/24, which is owned by
a UK VPS provider. The directory authorities started re-
jecting the relays five hours after they joined the network.
The relays advertized the default bandwidth of 1 GiB/s
and used randomly determined ports. The Sybils were
active in parallel to the “LizardNSA” attack, but there is
no reason to believe that both incidents were related.
The “Anonpoke” Sybils All relays shared the nick-
name “Anonpoke” and were online for four hours un-
til they were rejected. All relays were hosted by a VPS
provider in the U.S., Rackspace, with the curious excep-
tion of a single relay that was hosted in the UK, and run-
ning a different Tor version. The relays advertized the
default bandwidth of 1 GiB/s on port 9001 and 9030. All
relays were middle relays and running as directory mir-
ror. All Sybils were configured to be an onion service
directory, but did not manage to get the flag in time.
The “PlanetLab” Sybils A set of relays that used a
variation of the strings “planet”, “plab”, “pl”, and “plan-
etlab” as their nickname. The relays’ exit policy allowed
ports 6660–6667, but they did not get the Exit flag. The
Sybils were online for three days and then removed by
The Tor Project, as mentioned in a blog post [21]. The
blog post further says that the relays were run by a re-
searcher to learn more about “cloud computing and scal-
ing effects.”
The “LizardNSA” Sybils All relays were hosted in
the Google Cloud and only online for ten hours, until the
directory authorities started to reject them. The majority
of machines were middle relays (96%), but the attack-
ers also started some exit relays (4%). The Sybils were
set up to be onion service directories, but the relays were
taken offline before they could earn the HSDir flag. If all
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Figure 8: The churn distribution for seven relay flags.
We removed values greater than the plot whiskers.
relays would have obtained the HSDir flag in time, they
would have constituted almost 50% of all onion service
directories; the median number of onion service directo-
ries on December 26 was 3,551.
Shortly after the attack began, somebody claimed re-
sponsibility on the tor-talk mailing list [25]. Judging by
the supposed attacker’s demeanor, the attack was mere
mischief.
5.2 Churn rate analysis
We determined the churn rate between two subsequent
consensuses for all 72,061 consensuses that were pub-
lished between October 2007 and January 2016. Consid-
ering that (i) there are 162 gaps in the archived data, that
(ii) we create time series for joining and leaving relays,
and that (iii) we determined churn values for all twelve
relay flags, we ended up with (72,061− 162) · 2 · 12 =
1,725,576 churn values. Figure 8 shows a box plot for
the churn distribution (joining and leaving churn values
concatenated) for the seven most relevant relay flags. We
removed values greater than the plot whiskers (which
extend to values 1.5 times the interquartile range from
the box) to better visualize the width of the distribu-
tions. Unsurprisingly, relays with the Guard, HSDir, and
Stable flag experience the least churn, probably because
relays are only awarded these flags if they are particu-
larly stable. Exit relays have the most churn, which is
surprising given that exit relays are particularly sensitive
to operate. Interestingly, the median churn rate of the
network has steadily decreased over the years, from 0.04
in 2008 to 0.02 in 2015.
Figure 9 illustrates churn rates for five days in August
2008, featuring the most significant anomaly in our data.
On August 19, 822 relays left the network, resulting in a
sudden spike, and an increase in the baseline. The spike
was caused by the Tor network’s switch from consensus
format version three to four. The changelog says that in
version four, routers that do not have the Running flag
are no longer listed in the consensus.
To alleviate the choice of a detection threshold, we
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Figure 9: In August 2008, an upgrade in Tor’s consensus
format caused the biggest anomaly in our dataset. The
positive time series represents relays that joined and the
negative one represents relays that left.
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Figure 10: The number of alerts (in log scale) in 2015
as the detection threshold increases, for three smoothing
window sizes.
plot the number of alerts (in log scale) in 2015 as the
threshold increases. We calculate these numbers for
four simple moving average window sizes. The result
is shown in Figure 10. Depending on the window size,
thresholds greater than 0.012 seem practical considering
that 181 alerts per year average to approximately one
alert in two days—a tolerable number of incidents to in-
vestigate. Unfortunately, we are unable to determine the
false positive rate because we do not have ground truth.
5.3 Uptime analysis
We generated relay uptime visualizations for each month
since 2007, resulting in 100 images. We now discuss a
subset of these images that contain particularly interest-
ing patterns.
Figure 11 shows June 2010, featuring a clear “Sybil
block” on the left side. The Sybils belonged to a re-
searcher who, as documented by The Tor Project [21],
started several hundred Tor relays on PlanetLab for re-
search on scalability. Our manual analysis could ver-
ify this. The relays were easy to identify because their
nicknames suggested that they were hosted on Planet-
Lab, containing strings such as “planetlab,” “planet,” and
“plab.” Note the small height of the Sybil block, indicat-
Figure 11: In June 2010, a researcher started several hun-
dred Tor relays on PlanetLab [21]. Die image shows the
uptime of 2,000 relays for all of June.
Figure 12: August 2012 featured a curious “step pattern,”
caused by approximately 100 Sybils. The image shows
the uptime of 2,000 relays for all of August.
ing that the relays were only online for a short time.
Figure 12 features a curious “step pattern” for approx-
imately 100 relays, all of which were located in Russia
and Germany. The relays appeared in December 2011,
and started exhibiting the diurnal step pattern (nine hours
uptime followed by fifteen hours downtime) in March
2012. All relays had similar nicknames, consisting of
eight seemingly randomly-generated characters. In April
2013, the relays finally disappeared.
Figure 13 shows the effect of the Heartbleed inci-
dent [12] on the Tor network. Several days after the in-
cident, The Tor Project decided to block all relays that
had not generated new key pairs. The large red rectangle
on the left side of the image illustrates when the biggest
part of the block became active, rejecting approximately
1,700 Tor relay fingerprints.
Figure 14 illustrates the largest Sybil group to date,
comprising 4,615 Tor relays that an attacker started in the
Google cloud in December 2014. Because of its magni-
tude, the attack was spotted almost instantly, and The Tor
Project removed the offending relays only ten hours after
they appeared.
5.4 Fingerprint anomalies
We determined how often all Tor relays changed their
fingerprint from 2007 to 2015. Figure 15 illustrates the
number of fingerprints (y axis) we have observed for the
1,000 Tor relays (x axis) that changed their fingerprint the
most. All these relays changed their fingerprint at least
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Figure 13: In April 2014, the Heartbleed bug forced The
Tor Project to reject many affected relays. The image
shows the uptime of 3,000 relays for all of April.
Figure 14: In December 2014, a group of attacker started
several hundred Tor relays in the Google cloud. The im-
age shows the uptime of 4,000 relays for all of December.
ten times. Twenty one relays changed their fingerprint
more than 100 times, and the relay at the very right end
of the distribution changed its fingerprint 936 times. This
relay’s nickname was “openwrt,” suggesting that it was a
home router that was rebooted regularly. It was running
from August 2010 to December 2010.
Figure 15 further contains a peculiar plateau, shown in
the shaded area between index 707 and 803. This plateau
was caused by a group of Sybils, hosted in Amazon EC2,
that changed their fingerprint exactly 24 times. Upon in-
spection, we noticed that this was likely an experiment
for a Security and Privacy 2013 paper on deanonymizing
Tor onion services [4].
We also found that many IP addresses in the range
199.254.238.0/24 changed their fingerprint frequently.
We contacted the owner of the address block and were
told that the block used to host VPN services. Appar-
ently, several people started Tor relays and since the VPN
service would not assign permanent IP addresses, the Tor
relays would periodically change their address, causing
the churn we observe.
5.5 Accuracy of nearest-neighbor search
Given a single Sybil relay, how good is our nearest-
neighbor search at finding the remaining Sybils? To an-
swer this question, we now evaluate our algorithm’s ac-
curacy, which we define as the fraction of neighbors it
correctly labels as Sybils. For example, if eight out of
ten Sybils are correctly labeled as neighbors, the accu-
racy is 0.8.
A sound evaluation requires ground truth, i.e., relays
that are known to be Sybils. All we have, however, are re-
lays that we believe to be Sybils. In addition, the number
of Sybils we found is only a lower bound—we are un-
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Figure 15: The number of observed fingerprints for the
1,000 relays that changed their fingerprints the most.
likely to have detected all Sybil groups. Therefore, our
evaluation is doomed to overestimate our algorithm’s ac-
curacy because we are unable to test it on the Sybils we
did not discover.
We evaluate our search algorithm on two datasets; the
“bad exit” Sybil groups from Table 4, and relay families.
We chose the bad exit Sybils because we observed them
running identical, active attacks, which makes us confi-
dent that they are in fact Sybils. Recall that a relay family
is a set of Tor relays that is controlled by a single opera-
tor, but configured to express this mutual relationship in
the family members’ configuration file. Relay families
are benign Sybils. As of January 2016, approximately
400 families populate the Tor network, ranging in size
from only two to 25 relays.
We evaluate our algorithm by finding the nearest
neighbors of a family member. Ideally, all neighbors
are family members, but the use of relay families as
ground truth is very likely to overestimate results because
family operators frequently configure their relays iden-
tically on purpose. At the time of this writing, a pop-
ular relay family has the nicknames “AccessNow000”
to “AccessNow009,” adjacent IP addresses, and identi-
cal contact information—perfect prerequisites for our al-
gorithm. We expect the operators of malicious Sybils,
however, to go out of their way to obscure the relation-
ship between their relays.
To determine our algorithm’s accuracy, we used all re-
lay families that were present in the first consensus that
was published in October 2015. For each relay that had
at least one mutual family relationship, we searched for
its n−1 nearest neighbors where n is the family size. Ba-
sically, we evaluated how good our algorithm is at find-
ing the relatives of a family member. We determined
the accuracy—a value in [0,1]—for each family mem-
ber. The result is shown in Figure 16(b), a distribution of
accuracy values.
Next, we repeated the evaluation with the bad exit
Sybil groups from Table 4. Again, we searched for the
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Figure 16: ECDF for our two evaluations, the bad exit
Sybils in Fig. 16(a) and the benign family Sybils in
Fig. 16(b).
Method Analysis window Run time
Churn Two consensuses ∼0.16s
Neighbor search One consensus ∼1.6s
Fingerprint One month ∼58s
Uptimes One month ∼145s
Table 3: The computational cost of our analysis tech-
niques.
n−1 nearest neighbors of all bad exit relays, where n is
the size of the Sybil group. The accuracy is the fraction
of relays that our algorithm correctly classified as neigh-
bor. The result is illustrated in Figure 16(a).
As expected, our algorithm is significantly more ac-
curate for the family dataset—66% of searches had per-
fect accuracy. The bad exit dataset, however, did worse.
Not a single search had perfect accuracy and 59% of all
searches had an accuracy in the interval [0.3,0.6]. Never-
theless, we find that our search algorithm facilitates man-
ual analysis given how quickly it can provide us with a
list of the most similar relays. Besides, false positives
(i.e., neighbors that are not Sybils) are cheap as sybil-
hunter users would not spend much time on neighbors
that bear little resemblance to the “seed” relay.
5.6 Computational cost
Fast techniques lend themselves to being run hourly, for
every new consensus, while slower ones must be run less
frequent. Table 3 gives an overview of the runtime of our
methods.5 We stored our datasets on a solid state drive
to eliminate I/O as performance bottleneck.
The table columns contain, from left to right, our anal-
ysis technique, the technique’s analysis window, and how
long it takes to compute its output. Network churn cal-
culation is very fast; it takes as input only two consen-
sus files and can easily be run for every new network
consensus. Nearest-neighbor search takes approximately
5We determined all performance numbers on an Intel Core i7-
3520M CPU at 2.9 GHz, a consumer-grade CPU.
1.6 seconds for a single consensus counting 6,942 relays.
Fingerprint and uptime analysis for one month worth of
consensuses takes approximately one and two minutes,
respectively—easy to invoke daily, or even several times
a day.
6 Discussion
After having used sybilhunter in practice for several
months, we elaborate on both our operational experience
and the shortcomings we encountered.
6.1 Operational experience
Our practical work with sybilhunter taught us that de-
tecting Sybils frequently requires manual work; for ex-
ample, comparing a new Sybil group with a previously
disclosed one, sending decoy traffic over Sybils, or sort-
ing and comparing information in their descriptors. It
is difficult to predict all kinds of manual analyses that
might be necessary in the future, which is why we de-
signed sybilhunter to be highly interoperable with Unix
command line tools [29]. Its CSV-formatted output can
easily be piped into tools such as sed, awk, and grep. We
found that compact text output was significantly easier to
process, both for plotting results and for manual analy-
sis. We also found that sybilhunter can serve as valuable
tool to better understand the Tor network and monitor its
reliability. Our techniques can disclose network consen-
sus issues and illustrate the wide diversity of Tor relays,
providing empirical data that can support future network
design decisions.
We are also working with The Tor Project on incorpo-
rating our techniques in Tor Metrics [33], a web site that
contains network visualizations, which are frequented by
numerous volunteers that sometimes report anomalies.
By incorporating our techniques, we hope to benefit from
“crowd-sourced” Sybil detection.
6.2 Limitations
In Section 4.2 we argued that we are unable to prevent
all Sybil attacks. An adversary unconstrained by time
and money can add an unlimited number of Sybils to the
network. Indeed, Table 2 contains six Sybil groups that
sybilhunter was unable to detect. Exitmap, however, was
able to expose these Sybils, which emphasizes the im-
portance of having diverse and complementary analysis
techniques to raise the bar for adversaries. By charac-
terizing past attacks and documenting the evolution of
recurring attacks, we can adapt our techniques, allowing
for the bar to be raised even further. However, this arms
race is unlikely to end, barring fundamental changes in
how Tor relays are operated. Given that attackers can
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stay under our radar, our results represent a lower bound
because we might have missed Sybil groups.
Finally, sybilhunter is unable to ascertain the purpose
of a Sybil attack. While the purpose is frequently obvi-
ous, Table 2 contains several Sybil groups that we could
not classify. In such cases, it is difficult for The Tor
Project to make a call and decide if Sybils should be re-
moved from the network. Keeping them runs the risk
of exposing users to an unknown attack, but removing
them deprives the network of bandwidth. Often, addi-
tional context is helpful in making a call. For example,
Sybils that are (i) operated in “bulletproof” ASes [19],
(ii) show signs of not running the Tor reference imple-
mentation, or (iii) spoof information in their router de-
scriptor all suggest malicious intent. In the end, Sybil
groups have to be evaluated case by case, and the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of blocking them have to be
considered.
7 Conclusion
We presented sybilhunter, a novel system that uses di-
verse analysis techniques to expose Sybils in the Tor
network. Equipped with this tool, we set out to ana-
lyze nine years of The Tor Project’s archived network
data. We discovered numerous Sybil groups, twenty of
which we present in this work. By analyzing these Sybil
groups sybilhunter discovered, we found that (i) Sybil
relays are frequently configured very similarly, and join
and leave the network simultaneously; (ii) attackers dif-
fer greatly in their technical sophistication; and (iii) our
techniques are not only useful for spotting Sybils, but
turn out to be a handy analytics tool to monitor and bet-
ter understand the Tor network. Given the lack of a cen-
tral identity-verifying authority, it is always possible for
well-executed Sybil attacks to stay under our radar, but
we found that a complementary set of techniques can go
a long way towards finding malicious Sybils, making the
Tor network more secure and trustworthy for its users.
Both code and data for this work are available online
at https://nymity.ch/sybilhunting/.
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A Exposed malicious exit relays
Table 4 provides an overview of our second dataset, 251
bad exit relays that we discovered between August 2014
and January 2016. We believe that all single relays in
the dataset were isolated incidents while sets of relays
constituted Sybil groups. Sybil groups marked with the
symbols †, ‡, and § were run by the same attacker.
B Supporting diagrams
Figure 17 shows the uptime matrix for the “default” Sybil
group for October 2015. Matrix rows represent consen-
suses and columns represent relays. As a result, a single
pixel shows if a given relay was online (black pixel) or
offline (white pixel) in a given consensus. The matrix
shows that many relays exhibit a diurnal uptime pattern.
Figure 17: Uptimes for the “default” Sybil group for Oc-
tober 2015. Many relays exhibit a diurnal pattern, sug-
gesting that the relays were powered off regularly.
15
Discovery # of relays Attack description
Aug 2014 1 The relay injected JavaScript into returned HTML. The script embedded another script from the
domain fluxx.crazytall.com—not clearly malicious, but suspicious.
Aug 2014 1 The relay injected JavaScript into returned HTML. The script embedded two other scripts, jquery.js
from the official jQuery domain, and clr.js from adobe.flashdst.com. Again, this was not necessarily
malicious, but suspicious.
Sep 2014 1 The exit relay routed traffic back into the Tor network, i.e., we observed traffic that was supposed
to exit from relay A, but came from relay B. The system presented by Ling et al. behaves the
same [24]; the authors proposed to run intrusion detection systems on Tor traffic by setting up an
exit relay that runs an NIDS system, and routes the traffic back into the Tor network after having
inspected the traffic.
Oct 2014 1 The relay injected JavaScript into returned HTML.
Oct 2014 1 The relay ran the MitM tool sslstrip [26], rewriting HTTPS links to unencrypted HTTP links in
returned HTML.
Oct 2014 1 Same as above.
Jan 2015 23‡ Blockchain.info’s web server redirects its users from HTTP to HTTPS. These relays tampered with
blockchain.info’s redirect and returned unprotected HTTP instead—presumably to sniff login cre-
dentials.
Jan 2015 1 The relay used OpenDNS as DNS resolver and had the web site category “proxy/anonymizer”
blocked, resulting in several inaccessible web sites, including torproject.org.
Feb 2015 1 The relay injected a script that attempted to load a resource from the now inaccessible torclick.net.
Curiously, torclick.net’s front page said “We place your advertising materials on all websites online.
Your ads will be seen only for anonymous network TOR [sic] users. Now it is about 3 million users.
The number of users is always growing.”
Feb 2015 17‡ Again, these relays tampered with HTTP redirects of Bitcoin web sites. Interestingly, the attack
became more sophisticated; these relays would only target connections whose HTTP headers re-
sembled Tor Browser.
Mar 2015 18‡ Same as above.
Mar 2015 1 The relay injected JavaScript and an iframe into the returned HTML. The injected content was not
clearly malicious, but suspicious.
Apr 2015 70† These exit relays transparently rewrote onion domains in returned HTML to an impersonation do-
main. The impersonation domain looked identical to the original, but had different Bitcoin ad-
dresses. We believe that this was attempt to trick Tor users into sending Bitcoin transactions to
phishing addresses.
Jun 2015 55† Same as above.
Aug 2015 4† Same as above.
Sep 2015 1 The relay injected an iframe into returned HTML that would load content that made the user’s
browser participate in some kind of mining activity.
Nov 2015 1 The relay ran the MitM tool sslstrip.
Nov 2015 8† Same as the relays marked with a †.
Dec 2015 1§ The relay ran the MitM tool sslstrip.
Dec 2015 1§ Same as above.
Jan 2016 43† Same as the relays marked with a †.
Table 4: An overview of our second dataset, 251 malicious exit relays that we discovered using exitmap. We believe
that Sybil groups marked with an †, §, and ‡ were run by the same adversary.
16
